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Abstract
Online social networks (OSNs) have become an integral part of social interaction and communication between
people. Reasons include the ubiquity of OSNs that is offered through mobile devices and the possibility to bridge
spatial and temporal communication boundaries. However, several researchers have raised privacy concerns due to
the large amount of user data shared on OSNs. Yet, despite the large body of research addressing OSN privacy issues,
little differentiation of data types on social network sites is made and a generally accepted classification and
terminology for such data is missing. The lack of a terminology impedes comparability of related work and discussions
among researchers, especially in the case of privacy implications of different data types. To overcome these
shortcomings, this paper develops a well-founded terminology based on a thorough literature analysis and a
conceptualization of typical OSN user activities. The terminology is organized hierarchically resulting in a taxonomy of
data types. The paper furthermore discusses and develops a metric to assess the privacy relevance of different data
types. Finally, the taxonomy is applied to the five major OSNs to evaluate its generalizability.
Keywords: Taxonomy; Privacy; Data types; Online social networks; Social identity management; Classification; Privacy
relevance metric
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) have reached major
importance due to their increased usage and ubiquity, ris-
ing membership, and presence in the media. Allowing
their users to create custom profile sites, express relation-
ships with other users, and explore the resulting social
graph [1], they combine previously available communica-
tion and self-representation functions, such as personal
blogs, forums, and instant messaging with novel social
functions. Also, they allow reaching new contacts. The
user base of OSNs is no longer restricted to private end
users and college communities [2] but extends to profes-
sionals while serving as collaboration tools [3].
1.1 Privacy threats and the need for different data types
With the increased usage frequency and ubiquitous usage
of OSNs, the quantity and sensitivity of user data that is
stored on OSNs has grown tremendously as well. This is
fostered by the availability of social networking services on
mobile devices that provide location-based features and
camera functions, for instance, allowing users to publish
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their current activity and location. For service providers, it
is possible to derive rich profiles of their users [4], leading
to social footprints [5].
Further privacy issues occur not only due to the service
provider’s data usage but also because other OSN users
have access to user data. Similar to the physical world,
OSNs need to offer means to create different images of
the self, such as facets to cover the professional aspects
of OSN-facilitated communication and further facets for
family and friend-related representations of one’s person-
ality. Historically, creating and managing multiple facets
of one’s identity is not a OSN-specific phenomenon but
part of everyday life. In historical records of ancient
Greece, for instance, Plato refers to social interaction as
the ‘great stage of human life’ (in Burns [6]). Sociolo-
gist Erving Goffman labels people’s desire to control their
appearances for different audiences as impression man-
agement [7]. Privacy is violated if information intended
for a particular audience (such as one’s family) uninten-
tionally becomes available to another audience (such as
one’s employer). This understanding of privacy as respect-
ing social norms of intended contexts is also referred to as
contextual integrity [8].
On OSNs, on the one hand, the disembodied environ-
ment of these sites emphasizes the communication part
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of social interaction. On the other hand, most commu-
nication is conducted in an asynchronous manner, i.e.,
OSNs need to provide a variety of different data types to
adequately map social interaction onto the World Wide
Web and to cover all aspects of social communication.
This need for targeted and selective disclosure of per-
sonal information to create several facets of the self -
representing different areas of the physical world - and
keep them separated is also referred to as Social Identity
Management (SIdM) [9].
1.2 Existing privacy-related research
Prompted by these developments, privacy concerns have
been voiced by researchers. Numerous studies have
been conducted on privacy issues on OSNs in general
[10,11] as well as on people’s awareness in this context
[12,13] and on potential hazards [14,15]. Proposals for
improving the user’s understanding of disclosed infor-
mation [16], enhanced access control models [17], and
improved privacy protection on OSNs [18] have been
made.
Observing the literature on privacy and user control
in OSNs shows that there is little work describing data
elements that are associated with the users, albeit survey-
ing the application programming interface (API) of the
popular site Facebook that reveals a large number of dis-
tinct data elements that can be associated with a user
[19]. Related work in assessing the access control mod-
els in OSNs (e.g., [20,21]) does not differentiate between
different attributes of the user identity, while others only
focus on singular aspects such as the owner and creator of
items [22]. Still, it is seldom or only briefly [23] considered
that attributes on OSNs vary widely in implementation,
semantics, applicable policies [24], and privacy controls
[25] and thus carry far-reaching implications for the
user.
This paper aims at tackling the lack of a generally
accepted terminology for describing and differentiat-
ing data types on OSNs by developing and propos-
ing a detailed taxonomy.a It is intended to benefit
discussions among researchers, alleviate difficulties when
comparing data elements within and across OSNs, and
provide guidance for end users when assessing the pri-
vacy implications in dealing with particular OSN data
types. To further ease the assessment of privacy threats,
the paper introduces steps toward a metric to quanti-
tatively assess the privacy relevance of particular data
types.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Work related to classifying OSN data types and privacy
metrics is discussed and compared to our contribution
in Section 2. The scope and methodology of the research
are defined in Section 3. The proposed taxonomy is intro-
duced in Section 4 accompanied by an analysis of related
literature and a conceptualization of fundamental OSN
user activities involving user data. Based on the data types
identified in the taxonomy, a privacy relevance metric
is developed in Section 5. The taxonomy is evaluated
in Section 6 by applying it to five major OSNs before
concluding the paper in Section 7.
2 Related work
This section provides an overview of important related
work with respect to our work. We outline research
regarding the study of user activities onOSNs, the concep-
tualization of data types, and the development of privacy
metrics for OSNs. Furthermore, we point out how our
paper distinguishes from related publications.
2.1 User activities on OSNs
Surma and Furmanek [26] and Zhang et al. [27] describe
fundamental user activities on OSNs. The former work
[26] focuses on user activities accustomed to a small com-
munity of OSNs, which is why it does not allow to draw
generic conclusions. The latter work [27] is conducted
on a high level of abstraction containing only three dif-
ferent entities and is used as a basis for the explanation
of the variables of a heterogeneous network. Despite the
unsuitable degree of abstraction and the completely dif-
ferent purposes, the study of user activities conducted in
this paper in order to derive originating data types has
been inspired by the user-centric approaches introduced
above.
2.2 Data types on OSNs
Ho et al. [10] mention two different approaches for cate-
gorizing data. The first one is based on a survey in which
users of OSNs were asked which data they would place
on their profile. Consequently, the resulting classification
only considers the items that were mentioned by the par-
ticipants of the survey. In the second approach presented
by Ho et al. [10], user data is divided by focusing on
the data’s impact on privacy. While reasonable for cate-
gorizing privacy settings, it is unsuitable for developing
a general-purpose taxonomy as many other dimensions
would be omitted. Similarly, Park et al. [4] also focus
on certain aspects of data on OSNs. Data is categorized
on the basis of its visibility (i.e., private or public) and
its creator (i.e., the user himself or others). As a conse-
quence, unlike this work, the categorization proposed by
Park et al. [4] lacks a discussion of activity-related data
types and solely focuses on the two dimensionsmentioned
before.
Beye et al. [28] follow a different approach that builds
upon the definition of OSN by Boyd [sic] and Ellison [1]
from which three data types are deduced. Additional six
data types are derived by focusing on the goals of differ-
ent OSNs. Compared to the approaches discussed so far,
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Beye et al.’s work [28] contains a well-founded explanation
on the origin of the data types. However, their definition
(e.g., the definition of the data type Messages) can be
considered too coarse-grained. No distinction is made
concerning the item’s visibility, its creator, and the domain
in which it is created. These aspects are of major impor-
tance when analyzing the user’s capabilities on modern
OSNs.
Unlike other approaches which developed their classifi-
cations only as a basis for further examinations, Schneier
[23] focuses solely on the task of establishing a taxon-
omy. However, his brief discussion lacks a structured
methodology and does not mention any explanation on
how he deduced the data types. Moreover, his taxon-
omy does not cover all important aspects of OSNs. For
example, there are no data types in which the user’s
relationships or his connection-related attributes (e.g.,
Internet Protocol (IP) address) can be arranged. Årnes
et al. [29] pick up the ideas proposed by Schneier [23].
Although being a meaningful extension to the work pre-
sented by Schneier [23], this approach also does not go
into detail about the particular data types and is lim-
ited to a short definition and a list of examples for each
category.
A major distinction between all previously discussed
approaches and this paper is the level of granularity.
Rather than aiming at a high-level classification, this work
proposes a fine-grained taxonomy. In addition, the indi-
vidual data types are arranged hierarchically, which is a
common feature of taxonomies.
2.3 Privacy scoring for OSNs
Besides data types in OSNs and their classification, cur-
rent research lacks an analysis of the privacy risks which
single data types of the proposed taxonomies are accom-
panied with. A first step toward this direction has been
made by Liu and Terzi [30] who proposed a framework
for computing the privacy scores of users on OSNs. They
developed mathematical models to assess the sensitiv-
ity and visibility of disclosed information. Their privacy
score as an aggregation of combined sensitivity and vis-
ibility values provides a measure for the privacy risk a
user faces. As the data basis for this score only involves
the user’s current privacy settings and the user’s posi-
tion in the social network, the authors assume that the
user alone is responsible for the dissemination of his
privacy-relevant data. However, as we will point out dur-
ing the development of our taxonomy, privacy is signifi-
cantly impacted by the creator and the publisher of data
as well as the domain information is published in. The
fact that privacy relevant data can be disclosed outside
the user’s domain bears additional potential risks. Fur-
ther approaches to measure privacy risks include the work
of Cutillo et al. [31] and Becker et al. [32]. The former
assesses the achievable privacy degree in an OSN based
on graph topology measures, such as degree distribution,
clustering coefficient, and mixing time. Becker et al. [32],
in contrast, measure the privacy risks attributed to direct
social contacts. Similar to the work published by Liu and
Terzi [30], these approaches do not make a differentiation
between different data types but provide an aggregated
value to measure the comprehensive privacy risks a user
faces.
3 Research scope and approach
3.1 Problem scope
This work aims at developing a taxonomy for describing
and classifying data types on OSNs, thereby benefiting
three areas. The first goal is to improve comparability
of user data within and across OSNs. Further, it intends
to provide a clear terminology for discussions among
researchers. Lastly, it aims at improving the understand-
ing of attribute characteristics on OSNs and their implica-
tions by end users.
The goal of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive
list of all attributes and data elements that are available or
disclosed on current OSNs. Rather, it intends to develop
a taxonomy to describe important characteristics of data
types on OSNs and understand their differences, espe-
cially with regards to characteristics specific to OSNs and
SIdM.
Note that this work focuses on centralized OSNs and
only covers data types related to user actions that occur
directly on them. External aspects like social plugins (e.g.,
Facebook’s Like button) create extensive privacy issues.
However, they have to be discussed separately and are out
of the scope of this paper. Also, note that the subsequent
discussions are solely based on facts and that no assump-
tions regarding the actions of OSN service providers are
made.
3.2 Research approach
Aiming at delivering a taxonomy consisting of constructs
for describing data types on OSNs that are used for
abstracting from particular data types, a design-oriented
research approach [33,34] is applicable to the problem
scope. For conducting design-oriented research, a process
model consisting of six steps - problem identification, elic-
itation of solution objectives, solution design, demonstra-
tion, evaluation, and communication - has been proposed
[34].
The research approach employed in this work adapts the
process proposed by Peffers et al. [34]. The first step has
been performed in the previous two sections by identify-
ing the problem and motivating the need for a taxonomy
for data types on OSNs. Also, the corresponding research
gap has been identified. Subsequently, the objectives of
developing the taxonomy have been identified previously
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in this section, thus constituting the second step of the
design research process.
The research model depicted in Figure 1 shows the core
steps performed in this paper. As a preparation for devel-
oping the taxonomy, the body of the related literature is
analyzed with regards to possible elements of an OSN
attribute taxonomy (Section 4). A conceptualization of
fundamental user activities between the user, the OSN,
and possibly the user’s contacts that affect user data com-
plements this analysis (step 1 in Figure 1). Based on these
foundations, the proposed taxonomy is discussed thor-
oughly, which corresponds to the third step of the design
research process model [34].
Evaluation is deemed as a central and essential activity
[35] and a key element [36] in design-oriented research.
Correspondingly, the design research process [34] con-
tains both a demonstration and a dedicated evaluation
step. The taxonomy is demonstrated (step 2 in Figure 1)
by applying it to five major OSNs and identifying actually
implemented data types for each element of the taxonomy
(Section 6). Besides demonstration, the taxonomy is eval-
uated by identifying all data types of the OSN Facebook
and iterating over all these data types and mapping them
into the taxonomy (step 3 in Figure 1).
The presentation of results in this paper concludes one
iteration of the design science process and corresponds to
the communication step.
4 Proposed taxonomy
To arrive at a taxonomy for OSN data types, this section
follows the previously outlined research model. In an ini-
tial step and based on Section 2, a thorough literature
analysis reveals in essence the following three related
approaches: Schneier [23], its refinement by Årnes et al.
[29], and the classification by Beye et al. [28]. Figure 2
correlates the data elements of these approaches and the
taxonomy proposed in this work, while the subsequent
discussion of this section highlights conceptual similari-
ties and deviations.
The analysis of Figure 2 leads to several observations:
Firstly, it reveals that to some extent terminology is not
consistently used, such as the different understanding of
behavioral data [23,29] and behavioral information [28].
Secondly, a general lack of granularity can be attributed to
some existing data type definitions, as observable in Beye
et al.’s generic conceptualization of profiles [28]. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to precisely specify data elements
as needed in scientific discussions. Lastly, some related
work either does not cover all available data types, such as
the missing specification of data related to the connection
with other users in Schneier’s proposal [23], or focuses on
data elements whose existence is difficult to verify (e.g.,
the probability-based derived data in Schneier’s [23] and
in Årnes et al.’s [29] work that stems from the combination
of several other data types).
Based on the analysis of existing literature, this work
follows a user-centric approach by studying data that is
created during possible user activities on OSNs. Figure 3
illustrates OSN entities and possible activities. As can be
seen, most activities are either initiated by the user or one
of his contacts. The subsequent elicitation of data types
will refer to the numbered steps in Figure 3 to clarify the
origin of a particular data element.
As a taxonomy is commonly regarded a hierarchical
classification, this paper takes a top-down approach step-
wise subdividing the set of data types into non-redundant
partitions. The process is repeated until all data types are
classified. At the first level, a distinction is made based
on the stakeholder for whom a particular data type is
of use. From a privacy point of view, two stakeholders
are distinguishable [37]: service providers and OSN users.
The former group offers OSN platforms and related ser-
vices whereas personal data commonly provides the basis
of their business model. For OSN users as the second
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conceptualization
Analysis,
taxonomy design
Proposed OSN data
type taxonomy
Evaluation
Implemented OSNs
Demonstration
Body of
knowledge
1
2
3
Implemented OSNsImplemented OSNs
pr
ev
io
us
kn
ow
le
dg
e
a
dd
itio
ns
to
kn
ow
le
dg
e
ba
se
Related literature
Figure 1 Research model.
Richthammer et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2014, 2014:11 Page 5 of 17
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/11
Schneier [23] Årnes et al. [29] Proposed Taxonomy Beye et al. [28]
Login data Login credentials
Mandatory dataMandatory profile dataService data
ProfilesExtended profile dataExtended profile data
Network data ConnectionsPersonal network data
Ratings / interests Preferences / ratings / interests
Private communication data
Groups
Disclosed data
Entrusted data
Incidental data
Disseminated data
Contextual data
Application data
Connection data
Self published data at home
Self published data away
Other users‘ data
Behavioral data
Connection data
Metadata
Derived data
Behavioral data
Disclosed data
Entrusted data
Incidental data
Derived data
Behavioral information
Tags
Messages
Multimedia
Conception: deviatingcorresponding
Figure 2Mapping between data types of related classifications and this work.
stakeholder, personal data is used for the purpose of SIdM.
In the following, accruing data types for each stakeholder
are discussed in detail.
4.1 Service provider-related data types
Note that while service providers of centralized OSNs typ-
ically have access to personal data that is generated in
user-related activities, this section discusses only data that
originates from the service usage. Drawing on user activi-
ties identified in Figure 3, several service provider-related
activities can be identified. In the following, data emerging
from these activities is classified into three separate data
types. To assess the privacy impact of service provider-
related data types in general, it is valuable to recall that
privacy is a social concept. In more detail, privacy is
breached if other people that have a relationship with
the user gain access to this data. For service providers,
in contrast, such a relationship does commonly not exist.
Moreover, data is typically processed by machines and
algorithms without human interaction. Nevertheless, in
the longer run, the data types which are subsequently
discussed may lead to social privacy implications. For
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instance, if such data becomes publicly available (e.g.,
through data breaches), people that do have a relation
with the user can use this data to gain more knowledge
and thereby invade his privacy. Consequently, protection
is necessary and therefore discussed for each of the service
provider-related data types.
4.1.1 Login data
OSN service usage requires prior user authentication to
prevent identity theft, which is represented by activity 8
in Figure 3 and is consistent with Beye et al.’s respective
data type [28] (cf. Figure 2). Consequently, login data is
considered a data type that is required by the OSN ser-
vice provider to provide evidence of a claimed identity.
Common instances of this data type are identifiers such as
username and email address as well as passwords used to
verify an identity. From a privacy perspective, identifiers
such as the user’s email address may facilitate the link-
ability of different partial identities and may lead to the
compilation of a more comprehensive profile. In addition,
inadequate protection of login data may allow other users
to access a user’s profile and gain access to personal infor-
mation that was not intended for them. This may cause
a violation of privacy in the sense of contextual integrity
(cf. Section 1).
4.1.2 Connection data
While not OSN-specific, requesting - i. e., connecting to
and using - Internet-based services (activity 8 in Figure 3)
leads to a variety of digital traces created by protocols on
several layers of the OSI model. Figure 2 shows that the
definition is consistent with the work presented by Årnes
et al. [29], while a broader conceptualization is used by
Beye et al. [28]. Instances include the user’s IP address,
the type of communication unit (such as mobile devices),
information related to the browser and the operating sys-
tem, and location (derived from the IP address or using
GPS). Especially browser-related information and loca-
tion are deemed sensitive and entail privacy implications
when being available to OSN service providers, such as for
acquiring detailed user information through cookies and
browsing history or for creating a movement profile based
on location data. Attacks, such as browser fingerprinting,
have been successfully demonstrated, allowing users to be
identified solely based on their HTTP headers even if they
update their browser version [38]. In this case, it is not
the actual data that is contained in this data type which
is of privacy importance but rather the potential to use
this data to de-anonymize users, link previously unrelated
personal information, and thereby invade privacy.
4.1.3 Application data
Besides OSN platform usage, data originating from the
use of third party services (activity 6 in Figure 3) running
within the boundaries of the OSN platform or having
API access can be differentiated. None of the related
work explicitly focuses on this type of data. Common
examples are player statistics of OSN games, application
usage statistics, or in-app purchase data such as credit
card information. This data type may entail both pri-
vacy and security risks. On the one hand, data security
largely depends on the trustworthiness and protection
mechanisms of the service provider and third party ser-
vices. Breaches may lead to serious consequences such
as credit card fraud. On the other hand, privacy may be
threatened if third party usage statistics become avail-
able. For instance, an employer may notice that one of his
employees is playing OSN games during working hours.
4.2 User-related data types
To model the diversity of a user’s personality and his ways
of social interaction, an OSN account offers a variety of
means to express oneself and communicate with other
users. Fundamentally, two classes of data can be distin-
guished: semantically specified and semantically unspeci-
fied data. The first category refers to data instances that
have a clearly defined meaning and whose content is
clearly understood. Examples include predefined attribute
types of an OSN profile such as name, birthdate, and
hometown. Yet, OSN service providers have acknowl-
edged that it is difficult to force all aspects of a user’s
personality into well-specified conceptual boxes. Hence,
semantically unspecified data types are provided to freely
express some facets of one’s personality, such as sta-
tus posts whose content is not semantically predefined.
Note that for some data types, a selective classification is
difficult as parts of the data type are semantically speci-
fied while others remain unspecified. For this taxonomy,
we focus on the data type’s value for classification. For
example, while the concept of a shared photograph is
semantically defined, its value is difficult to interpret and
consequently the data type is semantically unspecified.
As another example, for friend lists, not only the concept
itself but also its value (a set of contacts (which is also a
clearly specified concept)) is semantically defined.
4.2.1 Semantically specified
Data elements available for self-description and expres-
sion of one’s personality can be further subdivided into
mandatory and optional data types.
4.2.1.1 Mandatory data Similar to the physical world, a
minimal set of data is required to initiate social interac-
tion. Consequently, this class covers data that is needed for
an OSN service to be useful and to enable basic function-
alities such as user discovery and verification purposes.
Mandatory data refers to personal information that needs
to be provided by the user during the registration or
profile creation process (activity 7 in Figure 3), which -
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except from the terminology used - corresponds with the
works presented by Schneier [23] and Årnes et al. [29] (cf.
Figure 2). A common example is the user’s name serving
as an identifier for other users to create a social graph. Due
to age verification processes because of possibly inappro-
priate content and in order to preclude immature users,
the user’s birthday is also a frequently required attribute.
Privacy implications for mandatory data depend on the
concrete implementation by a OSN service provider. It
needs to be examined whether mandatory data becomes
part of the OSN user’s profile and if privacy settings are
available to restrict its visibility.
4.2.1.2 Optionally provided data Besides the manda-
tory data, several data types with clearly specified seman-
tics exist on OSNs that are subsequently discussed.
Extended profile data: OSNs offer a variety of prede-
fined attribute types that may be used to further describe
particular aspects of one’s personality. Note that extended
profile data solely refers to the user’s profile while other
parts of an OSN account are covered by further data
types. Consequently, properties of extended profile data
are the following: profile-centricity, optionality, prede-
fined attribute types with clear semantics, and in some
cases predefined attribute values. Typically, the process of
providing extended profile data (activity 7 in Figure 3) is
guided by a form that contains input fields for attribute
types, like address, education, favorite music, favorite
films, hobbies, and interests. The profile picture, which
is a common feature of OSNs, is also arranged in this
category. According to Figure 2, this is in line with the
conceptualizations presented by Schneier [23] and Årnes
et al. [29], while the profiles’ category presented by Beye
et al. [28] is considered too coarse-grained. From the
optionality of this data type, it follows that privacy risks
are manageable as it is down to the user to decide
whether to disclose a particular personal attribute. On
closer examination, available privacy settings are to be
considered as these define the granularity of the potential
audience that may access an attribute.
Ratings/Interests: Besides the extended profile data that
allows for a rich description, the study of user activi-
ties (activities 5 and 9 in Figure 3) reveals that binary or
predefined multi-value attributes related to existing enti-
ties such as pages and shared items which are used to
refine how one is seen by others (e.g., by liking favorite
bands). Corresponding with the data type proposed by
Beye et al. [28] in Figure 2, this class of data covers
expressed interests such as Facebook’s Like and Google’s
+1 and the rating of photos shared by other users. With
regards to privacy, two aspects need to be discussed. On
the one hand, privacy implications and privacy control
depend on default or available visibility settings. On the
other hand and in contrast to the structured listing of
mandatory and extended profile data, ratings and inter-
ests are typically bound to items shared by others and
hence are widely distributed across the OSN. Thus, aware-
ness of previously expressed ratings and interests becomes
increasingly important as it may allow others to draw
inferences from all instances of this data type about the
user’s personality.
Network data: As social interaction is an inherent prop-
erty of OSNs, users are encouraged to express their rela-
tionship with other users (activity 5 in Figure 3). The
collection of all connections of a particular user is often
referred to as his social graph [28] and describes data con-
cerning the network the user has built around himself
on the OSN, which conforms to the definition of Årnes
et al. [29] as presented in Figure 2. From the viewpoint of
a particular user, a single instance of network data has a
binary value, i.e., a connection either exists or not. Net-
work data may be uni- or bidirectional and differ in the
strength of a connection. Common examples include the
notions of friend, friend-of-friend, follower, and someone
you are following. Depending on its concrete implemen-
tation, network data may be visible by default or access to
it can be controlled by the user. Access to network data
can be considered to have a significant impact on privacy.
On the one hand, knowledge of a user’s social graph allows
to draw inferences about his identity and enables sybil
attacks on other OSNs by forging the user’s identity and
connected identities [39]. On the other hand, it has been
demonstrated that (partial) knowledge of a user’s social
graph (such as knowledge of groups he is member of) is
sufficient to reveal his identity [40].
Contextual data:While some data shared onOSNs con-
tains an atomic piece of information (such as the user’s
birthdate), other items such as pictures enclose a multi-
tude of information. This class of data refers to a property
of an existing item that is made explicit and provided
with semantics, hence forming a new data type. Common
examples include the tagging feature, allowing to make
peoples’ names (and eventually their identity) in an exist-
ing picture explicitly available to other OSN users (activity
3 in Figure 3). Further instances are the location of a
picture and the relation of a shared item to an activity
or an event. The comparison of existing taxonomies in
Figure 2 shows that while corresponding with Beye et al.’s
taxonomy [28], this type of data is only partly covered by
Schneier [23] and Årnes et al. [29]. Two aspects of con-
textual data are particularly of importance when assessing
the privacy risk. Firstly, contextual data is often a byprod-
uct of its primary data type and as such is sometimes not
explicitly visible to the user. As an example, a shared pic-
ture may contain a variety of information including the
cameramodel, camera owner and location. Secondly, con-
textual data is often machine-processable (while its host
data type can be semantically unspecified). Consequently,
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it allows service providers to extrapolite from contextual
data to the content of the host data type.
4.2.2 Semantically unspecified
Semantically unspecified data refers to data elements pro-
vided by the OSN where the data format is predefined but
whose content is left to the user and cannot trivially be
interpreted by machines. For instance, a photo album fea-
ture predefines the format (digital photos) but leaves the
picture’s content to the user (yet it is notable that OSN
service providers are increasingly making progress on face
recognition technologies). As a consequence, on the one
hand, it is difficult to make generalizations on privacy
risks associated with semantically unspecified data types
where risks largely depend on the content. On the other
hand, the lack of semantic specification impedes OSN ser-
vice providers from automatically processing this data. To
further refine the classification, a distinction can be made
between data used in 1:1 and 1:n communication.
4.2.2.1 Private communication data This class covers
data elements that originate from private communication
(i.e., 1:1 communication) between two OSN users (activ-
ity 4 in Figure 3), which is only partly covered in Beye
et al. [28] as illustrated in Figure 2. While private com-
munication may comprise text messages as well as other
media formats, their content is not semantically speci-
fied. Examples include private messages with or without
attachments, private video chats as well as smaller interac-
tions such as poking other users. Private communication
data is not accompanied with privacy risks as long as the
communication partner can be trusted, the OSN security
mechanisms prevent third parties from gaining access,
and the OSN service provider does not inspect the mes-
sages to an extent greater than roughly scanning them for
illegal content.
4.2.2.2 1 : n communication Besides private communi-
cation between two users, data with semantically unspec-
ified content can be shared with an audience of n other
users where n defines the degree of publicness. Each
of the subsequently discussed data types is concerned
with semantically unstructured data such as photos, sta-
tus messages, and comments, yet a differentiation is made
between creator, publisher, and the domain in which the
element is published (see Table 1). As can be seen from
Figure 2, the first three data types subsequently discussed
are based on the work presented by Schneier [23] and
Årnes et al. [29].
Disclosed data: A frequent user activity on OSNs is
to post information on one’s wall (activities 2 and 11 in
Figure 3). In conceptual terms, the data is generated and
published by a user in his own domain. Privacy of dis-
closed data largely depends on the availability of visibility
Table 1 Differences between disclosed data, entrusted
data, incidental data, and shared data
Creator Publisher Domain
Disclosed data User User User
Entrusted data User User Contact
Incidental data Contact Contact User
Disseminated data User Contact Contact
settings and the concrete implementation of the OSN ser-
vice provider. Apart from this, privacy is not affected as
the user is both the creator and publisher of the item (i.e.,
he intentionally wants the data instance to be visible to
others), and it is shared within the domain of the user (no
other users are affected with the shared item).
Entrusted data: In contrast, entrusted data refers
to information that is both user-generated and user-
published but in the domain of a contact (activities 2 and
10 in Figure 3), i.e., the former is able to shape the latter’s
representation on the OSN. Consequently, once the data
is shared, control passes over to the domain owner that
is from then on able to define its visibility. Whether this
ability is only extended or shifts completely depends on
the concrete OSN. Examples include posts and comments
made on another user’s wall or a similar space. Privacy
implications mainly arise from the loss of control once the
data element is published.
Incidental data: Incidental data originates from a con-
tact sharing a data element on the user’s wall (activities 1
and 11 in Figure 3), i.e., the contact is both the creator and
publisher, however, the information is shared in the user’s
domain. In this scenario, a contact is able to shape the
presentation of the user on the OSN. As a consequence,
the user gains control over the item, whereas the extent
depends on the concrete implementation.
Disseminated data: In the last case of Table 1, user-
generated data elements that are considered are further
disseminated by a contact within his own domain (activi-
ties 1 and 10 in Figure 3). This may include data elements
that the user has initially shared with the contact or pro-
vided to him using other communication channels. In the
first case, which is also discussed by Hu et al. [22], the
OSN may prevent the contact from publishing the item
with a larger than the user’s intended audience and grant
additional permissions to the user. However, in the sec-
ond case, the contact remains the only person to control
the visibility of the data element, raising serious privacy
implications.
4.3 Summary
Figure 4 provides an overview of the proposed taxonomy
based on the previous discussion. It comprises 13 data
types that are integrated in a hierarchical structure. The
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analysis of privacy implications of data types revealed that
privacy mainly depends on the interplay of a data ele-
ment’s content, the extent and granularity of user control,
and its concrete implementation. The content may be eas-
ily accessible to service providers for data types with clear
semantics, while semantically unspecified data requires
human cognition for interpretation. Besides, each service
provider decides whether the collection and visibility of
a particular data type is user-controllable. If user control
exists, its granularity largely depends on the concrete OSN
implementation.
5 Toward ametric for assessing privacy relevance
Taking a bird’s-eye view on our taxonomy, it becomes
clear that the data types classified differ in the privacy
risks they are accompanied with. Private communication
data, for instance, is obviously not privacy critical as long
as the communication partner is known and trusted. Dis-
closed data, in contrast, can be critical since one may
easily lose track of who is able to read the content. Further-
more, permissions or social graph structures could change
over time. As a result, a user could suddenly see messages
that were originally not visible to him. In order to make
the privacy relevance quantitatively measurable, a privacy
relevance metric (PRM) is needed.
OSN data is always created within a specific con-
text, which can be described through various attributes.
The range comprises general factors such as audience
size or audience composition as well as content-specific
attributes like the topic of a message. These attributes
form a finite context set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. Based on this
context set which serves as an input, our metric should
calculate the privacy relevance of a data type. For this
purpose, we compare the input context set (subsequently
denoted as b) to a reference context set (subsequently
denoted as a) which describes a scenario having no pri-
vacy issues. The outcome of the comparison should be a
value within the range [0,1] with 0 denoting no privacy rel-
evance (reference value) and 1 denotingmaximumprivacy
relevance.
To this end, we first provide a generic PRM that can eas-
ily be adapted to a set of preselected context attributes.
Secondly, we show how this generic PRM can be imple-
mented for the three context attributes audience size,
domain, and creator and publisher. In the evaluation
section, we finally demonstrate our PRM by measuring
the privacy relevance of the data types classified in our
taxonomy for a fictive profile on Facebook.
To further ease the understanding, we will use the fol-
lowing worked example during the development of our
metric: OSN user Jane posts a photograph within her
domain (e.g., on her wall) and sets the visibility to all of her
150 friends (i.e., audience size = 150). Using the taxon-
omy, this is classified as disclosed data. For Jane, the size
of the audience and who is creator and publisher is twice
as important as the domain in which the photograph is
posted.
5.1 Metric space and distance function
Context attributes can be modeled as a dimension in a
vector space. Therefore, we define an n-dimensional met-
ric space M, where each dimension is derived from one
context attribute of the context set C(|C| = n). We fur-
thermore introduce nmapping functions fi(c) to range the
context attributes to a predefined interval (either continu-
ous or discrete). To measure the distance of points in the
metric spaceM, various distance functions can be used. A
function
d : M × M → R
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is called distance function if it satisfies the following
conditions for all a,b ∈ M:
1. d(a,b) ≥ 0
2. d(a,b) = 0 if and only a = b
3. d(a,b) = d(b,a)
4. d(a,c) ≤ d(a,b) + d(b,c)
Exemplary distance measures are the Manhattan dis-
tance or the Euclidean distance which are two types of
the generic Minowski distance. The decision which dis-
tance measure to use depends on the application area. In
this work, we chose theManhattan distance which is more
robust to outliers.
To implement an exemplary PRM, we selected the three
context attributes audience size, domain, and creator and
publisher. These attributes form our context set C =
{c1, c2, c3}, where c1 takes values of the discrete interval
C1 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, while c2 and c3 take values of the nomi-
nal sets C2 = {user, contact} and C3 = { (user, user), (user,
contact), (contact, contact)}.
The spaceMprae is defined as follows:
Mprae : = C1 × C2 × C3
In Mprae, the single attributes are not comparable in
their values. This might lead to a bias in the final con-
text value. The audience size, for instance, is not neces-
sarily bounded from above allowing very high distances
between its members. The distances between members of
the nominal sets domain and creator and publisher must
be transformed before they can be measured. Hence, we
define three mapping functions fi(c) to range the values
within an interval of [0,γi]. γi is the weight factor that
allows to weight single context attributes based on their
importance. For γ1 = γ2 = γ3, each dimension has the
same impact on the global PRM. Thus, we define the final
metric spaceM as
M : = [0, γ1] × [0, γ2] × [0, γ3]
To make the privacy relevance measurable, we define
the distance function d˜ in our metric spaceM as follows:
d˜ : M × M →
[
0,
3∑
i=1
γi
]
, (a, b) →
3∑
i=1
(bi − ai)
A reasonable and intuitively understandable value range
for the distance as a relevance measure is [0,1] with 1
denoting a maximum privacy relevance and 0 denoting no
privacy relevance (absolute congruence to reference set).
Therefore, d˜ is scaled by the inverse of d˜max = ∑3i=1 γi
which quantifies the length of the diagonal in the metric
space. That leads to the final distance function d:
d : M × M →[0, 1]
d(a, b) := d˜(a, b)
d˜max
=
∑3
i=1(bi − ai)∑3
i=1(γi)
5.2 Context dimensions
The context dimensions depict the single attributes of
the context set C. Since the context attributes consist of
both structured and unstructured data of random val-
ues, modeling the mapping functions fi(c) can turn out to
be difficult. However, this is an important step because
parameters that vary greatly in size may have a much big-
ger impact on the distance than parameters that differ
only slightly, even though slight distinctions could have an
equal impact on the changes in context. In the following
paragraphs, we define the mapping functions fi(c) for the
three context attributes audience size, domain, and cre-
ator and publisher. In more detail, for each of the three
attributes of input context set b, a mapping function fi(c)
is defined. The same mapping functions are used for each
of the three attributes of reference context set a.
5.2.1 Audience size
As stated above, the audience size is critical for privacy
issues since an increased audience leads to a higher pri-
vacy risk. However, privacy relevance is not static and
exactly the same for similar classes in different profiles. It
depends on a user’s number of friends. To capture this, we
propose the following function:
f1(c1) = γ1 ∗
(
1 − e
c1∗ln(0.5)
nf
)
with c1 depicting the audience size and nf quantifying a
user’s number of friends. The outcome of this function
ranges in the interval of [ 0, γ1). Content that is only visi-
ble to the creator (audience size = 0) results in a value of
0, whereas content visible to the user’s friends is reflected
in a value of 0.5γ1. The value converges to γ1 for con-
tent being visible to all friends-of-friends or all users. The
logic modeled in this metric states that the growth of per-
ceived privacy risk decreases with an increasing audience
size. This coherence can be easily understood thinking
of a user who shares a secret with one person. Having
told two persons instead, the perceived privacy risk would
have been notably higher. Now think of 1,000 persons. The
difference of perceived privacy risk compared to sharing
the private information with 1,001 persons instead would
have been marginal.
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Continuing the worked example introduced previously
and assuming a weight factor of 2, the privacy relevance
of Jane’s audience size of 150 friends is calculated as
follows:
f1(c1) = 2 ∗
(
1 − e 150∗ln(0.5)150
)
= 1
5.2.2 Domain
Data can either be published in the user’s or in a contact’s
domain. If shared in the own domain, the user is the data
owner and can regulate the visibility and availability. Pub-
lished in a contact’s domain, in contrast, one passes these
privileges. That may lead to increased privacy risk. We
therefore model the domain function as follows:
f2(c2) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, if c2 = user
γ2, if c2 = contact
In the worked example, a weight factor for the domain
of 1 was assumed. Hence, the privacy relevance of the
domain attribute is calculated as follows:
f2(c2) = 1 ∗ 0 = 0
5.2.3 Creator and publisher
Serious privacy concerns are raised if the user creates con-
tent that is further disseminated by a contact within his
own domain. The user thereby loses control of his own
content. The third function is designed to cover this case:
f3(c3) =
⎧⎨
⎩
γ3, if c3 = {user, contact}
0, else
A weight factor of 2 for the creator and publisher
attribute in our worked example leads to the following
calculation:
f3(c3) = 2 ∗ 0 = 0
Based on these results, the overall privacy relevance for
Jane in the worked example can be calculated. As previ-
ously defined, the privacy relevance for each attribute of
the reference context set a is 0. Hence the overall privacy
relevance is
d(a, b) = (1 − 0) + (0 − 0) + (0 − 0)2 + 1 + 2 =
1
5 = 0.2
6 Evaluation
Two approaches are used to evaluate the proposed tax-
onomy, namely, demonstration (which is described as a
light-weight evaluation by Venable et al. [35]) of its effi-
ciency to solve a certain problem [34] and evaluation of
its suitability to map all data types of a given OSN. In
the first part of the evaluation, five major OSNs - Face-
book, Google+, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Instagram - are
analyzed under the aspect of using the proposed taxon-
omy. Note that the intention of the analysis is to show
the feasibility of the taxonomy in general and to present
the most common and most important examples for each
data type. With the help of these examples, the main dif-
ferences between the inspected OSNs can be shown in
a descriptive way that is comprehensible for casual OSN
users as well. The differences are highlighted by referring
to the availability and importance of the data types on the
particular OSN but also by pointing out existing privacy
implications and user control mechanisms. The second
part of the evaluation takes the opposite direction, setting
the starting point to the OSN (i.e., Facebook) with all its
data types. These data types are mapped into the taxon-
omy in order to show that it is able to cover all of them.
Finally, we demonstrate our privacy relevance metric and
discuss its benefits and shortcomings.
6.1 Application of the taxonomy to OSNs
Table 2 gives an overview on the data types of the
inspected OSNs as available on 4 March 2014.
6.1.1 Service provider-related data types
Login data can be found on all OSNs. Facebook, Google+,
Twitter, and LinkedIn all provide a login via email and
password. On Facebook, the phone number can replace
the email. On Twitter, a login is alternatively possible via
username and password. As opposed to the other four
OSNs, Instagram does not provide a login via email but
only via username.
Connection data is collected by all OSNs. In order to
inspect the items arranged in this category, the privacy
policies of the five OSNs have been analyzed. It is impor-
tant to state that these policies do not list every single
data item collected through the use of the platform. For
example, Google tries to arrange the collected data into
categories (e.g., device information, log information, loca-
tion information) and then mentions the most important
examples with the help of expressions like ‘such as’ and
‘may include.’ However, splitting up connection data in the
three data types mentioned above does not lead to bet-
ter results regarding the taxonomy because the analyzed
providers do not define them in the same way. Moreover,
the five inspected OSNs differ in the examples they list
and their level of detail. Nevertheless, all OSNs collect
similar data items that can be arranged in the categories
used by Google, which is why we also employ them in
Table 2.
Application data is available on all five inspected OSNs
because for all of them, there are connectors for external
websites or unofficial smartphone apps. On Facebook
and Google+, the number of third party applications
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Table 2 Demonstration of the taxonomy on Facebook, Google+, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Instagram
Data types Facebook Google+ Twitter LinkedIn Instagram
Login data Email, phone, password Email, password Email, username, password Email, password Username, password
Connection data Device, log, and location
information, cookies
Device, log, and location
information, cookies
Device, log, and location
information, cookies
Device, log, and location
information, cookies
Device, log, and location
information, cookies
Application data Usage statistics, credit
card data
Usage statistics, credit
card data
Usage statistics Usage statistics Usage statistics
Mandatory data Name, email, birthday, gender Name, email, birthday, gender Name, email Name, email, job status,
country, postal code
Name, email
Extended profile data General-purpose input fields General-purpose input fields Bio, location, website Professionally related
input fields
Phone, gender, bio, website
Ratings/interests Page, status/photo/video Page, status/photo/video Verified account, Tweet Organization, status Photo/video
Network data Unidirectional, bidirectional Unidirectional Unidirectional Bidirectional Unidirectional
Contextual data Tag in status/comment,
on photo, at location
Tag in status/comment,
on photo, at location
Mention in Tweet Tag in status/comment Tag on photo
Private commun. data Private message, video chat,
poke
Private message, video chat Private message Private message, InMail N/A
Disclosed data Text post, photo (album),
video, check-in
Text post, photo (album),
video, check-in
Text post, single photo Text post, single photo,
file attachments
Single photo, video
Entrusted data See disclosed data Restricted to comments N/A Restricted to comments Restricted to comments
Incidental data See disclosed data Restricted to comments N/A Restricted to comments Restricted to comments
Disseminated data See disclosed data See disclosed data See disclosed data See disclosed data See disclosed data
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is bigger by far as there are a lot of providers for
games. As mentioned in Section 4, games may process
credit card information because of in-app purchases,
whereas website connectors and smartphone apps do
not collect additional data (i.e., in addition to the data
already available without using the application) except
for the usage statistics. An important characteristic of
application data is its optionality, i.e., the user decides
about the use of third party applications. In the major-
ity of cases, confirmation for requested permissions is
required before being able to use an application. Conse-
quently, user control is implemented on a binary decision
basis.
6.1.2 User-related data types
As all OSNs include profiles, mandatory data and
extended profile data always exist. Basic items of manda-
tory data are name, email, birthday, and gender. The first
two items are mandatory on all inspected OSNs; the lat-
ter two items are only required on Facebook and Google+.
There is a peculiarity regarding email being mandatory on
Google+. Users do not have to provide an email account in
the first place but Google will automatically create one for
them, which is why we treat email also as mandatory here.
LinkedIn forces a new user to indicate his country and
postal code for networking purposes. Moreover, his job
status is mandatory as well, which is motivated by the way
LinkedIn describes itself - as a network for profession-
als. Note that email, birthday, and gender can usually be
hidden from other users, giving the user the ability to alle-
viate certain threats (e.g., social engineering attacks with
the help of personalized emails). If mandatory attributes
are hidden, they are only used for internal purposes, such
as using the user’s gender in order to address him with the
correct pronouns.
Which extended profile data is ultimately present in
addition to the profile photo and the cover photo - each
inspected OSN uses at least the concept of the profile
photo - depends on whether the OSN is a platform for
general purposes (e.g., Facebook, Google+) or for rather
specialized ones (e.g., LinkedIn). Facebook and Google+
offer the user the ability to provide a variety of attributes
such as basic info, contact info, work, education, and liv-
ing. Similarly, LinkedIn offers additional data elements to
refine one’s profile but with a professional focus (such
as experience, skills, publications, and awards). In con-
trast to the three OSNs mentioned before, Twitter does
not focus on this detailed self-presentation in one’s pro-
file and only offers three single input fields for extended
profile data. Instagram also only offers the input fields of
Twitter and adds the phone number as a fourth data item.
Although the provision of extended profile data is optional
on all OSNs, only Facebook and Google+ offer a selective
disclosure of attribute values. On Twitter, LinkedIn, and
Instagram, they are either publicly visible or only available
to oneself.
Ratings/Interests is a category that possesses differing
importance on OSNs but can be observed on all of them.
On Facebook and Google+, it is possible to express one’s
preference for all kinds of pages (e.g., persons, products,
sports). OnTwitter and LinkedIn, the pagesmainly resem-
ble verified accounts of well-known persons and orga-
nizations, respectively. Moreover, the focus lies more on
staying informed about these pages rather than publicly
demonstrating certain interests. Instagram is quite similar
to Twitter with regards to following pages of well-known
persons in order to stay up-to-date on them. However,
there are currently no indicators that officially verify a
celebrity page. Besides the pages mentioned above, the
inspected OSNs all provide mechanisms to express one’s
favor for the items that are available as disclosed data.
When focusing on the user’s control over the visibility
of his preferences, pages and disclosed data have to be
discussed separately. For disclosed data, the visibility of
one’s favor always depends on the visibility of the corre-
sponding item, whereas for pages, the visibility options are
different on the inspected platforms. As following pages
on Twitter and Instagram is done by establishing a uni-
directional connection to them, the visibility properties
are them same as for network data (see below), which
means that the pages users follow are publicly visible.
Users of Facebook and Google+ have the option to hide
their preferences.
As the term Online Social Network already indicates,
OSNs always include network data. The main differ-
ence between OSNs is whether the connections are
bidirectional (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn) or unidirectional
(e.g., Google+, Twitter, Instagram). As shown in Table 2,
Facebook is the only OSN that supports both types
of connections at the same time. However, the unidi-
rectional connections have to be enabled by the user
before others are able to follow him without befriend-
ing him. Another important difference can be observed
when analyzing the user’s ability to hide his social graph
from other users. Facebook, Google+, and LinkedIn
implement this feature, whereas Twitter and Instagram
always reveal your followers and the users you are
following.
Further differences between the inspected OSNs can be
observed when analyzing the presence of contextual data.
On Facebook and Google+, the user has the ability to
tag his contacts in text posts/comments, on photos, and
at locations. Although being limited to text posts, Twit-
ter’s tagging feature creates more extensive privacy issues
than the ones provided by Facebook and Google+ because
Twitter’s users lack the ability to remove these tags on
their own. LinkedIn also limits the tagging feature to ref-
erencing contacts in text posts/comments but here, these
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references can be easily removed. Instagram supports tags
on photos.
Private communication data can be found on all
inspected OSNs except Instagram. Facebook and Google+
offer this feature via instant messaging and without any
limitations concerning availability and text length. On
Twitter, private messages are provided via Direct Mes-
sages, which resemble a private Tweet and therefore are
limited to 140 characters. Apart from messages to con-
tacts, LinkedIn provides a feature called InMail, which is
advertised as a professional and credible way to reach any-
one on LinkedIn without prior introduction but which is
only available to premium users. In addition to text mes-
sages, Facebook and Google+ offer video chats as another
type of private communication data. Facebook also has the
poking feature mentioned in Section 4. The only way of
privately contacting another user on Instagram is to use
InstagramDirect, a feature that was introduced in Decem-
ber 2013, and disclose a photo or video item only for that
particular person. Thus, the two users are able to chat via
the comments under the item.
Significant discrepancies concerning the availability of
the data types have been identified when posting items.
Firstly, there are differences in the complexity of the items
and secondly, the ability to post them may be restricted
to the user’s own domain. Facebook and Google+ enable
their users to post text, photos, photo albums, videos,
their current location, and other objects (e.g., questions,
events). LinkedIn users are also able to post text and sin-
gle photos but cannot create entire albums. However, they
can enrich their status updates with other documents,
such as MS Office files or PDF files. In contrast, Twitter
limits its Tweets to text and single photos. Note that users
have the possibility to enrich their text posts with their
current location or a link to an uploaded video but not
to disclose these elements outside of a Tweet. Posting on
Instagram is - because of its specialized character - limited
to single photos and videos, which can also be enriched
with a location. Regardless of the complexity of the items,
the user is always able to post them in his own domain
(disclosed data) as well as to share the ones originally
published by his contacts (disseminated data). On the
contrary, posting in foreign domains without any content-
wise limitations is only possible on Facebook (entrusted
data and vice versa incidental data). However, Facebook’s
users can turn off this feature in their privacy settings and
are able to control the visibility of incidental data on a
fine-grained level. On Google+, LinkedIn, and Instagram,
posting in foreign domains is limited to commenting on
items disclosed by the domain’s owner. These comments
inherit the visibility of their corresponding items, giving
the domain’s owner full control over them. To be pre-
cise, LinkedIn users are able to post on organizations’
pages. But what we understand by foreign domains are
the domains of other human contacts. Publicly address-
ing contacts on Twitter is done by making a response
(e.g., @johndoe), which does not appear in the con-
tact’s domain and therefore is not treated as entrusted
data. With Instagram Direct, users are able to directly
share photos and videos with 1 to up to 15 contacts.
But similar to Twitter, media shared in this way stay in
the user’s domain and do not represent entrusted data.
Moreover, Instagram Direct has to be seen as some kind
of access control mechanism rather than posting in for-
eign domains. As incidental data is just the opposite
of entrusted data, it is limitedly present on Google+,
LinkedIn, and Instagram, and cannot be found on Twitter.
Summarizing the application of the taxonomy, most of
its elements can be found on all of the five inspected OSNs
demonstrating the suitability to describe the most impor-
tant characteristics of OSNs. Furthermore, it demon-
strated the taxonomy’s capability of capturing different
instantiations of a particular data type on different OSNs
and the number of items contained in it. This is especially
true for extended profile data where Twitter and Insta-
gram provide only a few additional input fields because
self-presentation is achieved by posting items and not
by entering static profile information here, and where
LinkedIn focuses more on work and science affiliated
attributes because of the orientation toward professional
networks. Another important observation is that Face-
book has most features, especially concerning the dis-
tinctive data types, i.e., entrusted/incidental data and
contextual data. Hence, there are more potential hazards
for casual OSN users and more aspects that might be
interesting for researchers in this area.
6.2 Mapping of Facebook data types into the taxonomy
In the previous section, we successfully applied the taxon-
omy to compare different OSNs, demonstrating its useful-
ness in one of its major usage scenarios. Subsequently, we
evaluate its ability to cover all data types existing on OSNs
by iterating overall OSN data types and mapping them
into the taxonomy. Hereunto, Facebook as the currently
largest and most popular OSN is used.
Facebook’s Graph API reference [19] is employed in
order to capture all data types. In particular, the focus is
on the root node /user including all of its edges and fields
except for /user/home and /user/notifications, which are
only used internally by Facebook for notification purposes
related to other data types. Besides the /user node, few
other nodes contain data types related to the user. They
aremarked by an asterisk (*) in Figure 5, which provides an
overview of the mapping of the aforementioned data types
into our taxonomy. Note that the denomination of the
root node /user is omitted to improve readability. A pre-
fixed slash (/) is used to distinguish edges from fields. In
order to cover all user-related data types on Facebook, we
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Figure 5Mapping of Facebook data types into the proposed taxonomy.
further include additional data types (such as connection
data and login data, e.g., the user’s password and browsing
history) into our analysis in addition to Facebook’s Graph
API reference.
Sections 2 and 4 already contain some exemplary
remarks concerning the shortcomings of the previously
published taxonomies. In order to illustrate their lim-
itations in detail, in Figure 5, we show their inability
to map some of Facebook’s data types (i.e., no suit-
able data type exists in their taxonomies). Data types
that cannot be mapped into the taxonomy introduced by
Schneier [23] are marked with 1), while those that can-
not be mapped into the taxonomies introduced by Årnes
et al.[29] and Beye et al. [28] are marked with 2) and 3),
respectively. For instance, Schneier’s taxonomy [23] can
be criticized for not being able to cover login data, con-
nection data, extended profile data, ratings/interests, net-
work data, contextual data, disseminated data, and private
communication data. The work presented by Årnes et
al. [29] improves on this but still does not feature any
equivalents for login data, disseminated data, and private
communication data. The taxonomy of Beye et al. [28]
has shortcomings related to its insufficient definitions of
login credentials as well as behavioral information and,
additionally, is missing an equivalent for application data.
Although it is possible to map the data types related to
1 : n communication and private communication into the
categories proposed by Beye et al. [28], a lot of privacy-
relevant information is lost when treating all of them
simply under the general termMessages.
6.3 Evaluation of the privacy relevance metric
As pointed out, privacy relevance depends on multiple
factors and varies for different OSNs and user profiles.
To demonstrate our metric, we created a fictive user pro-
file on Facebook that has 150 friends (nf = 150). We
mainly used Facebook’s default privacy settings. How-
ever, we changed the visibility of extended profile data to
‘friends’ in order to demonstrate the differences. For login
data, connection data, and application data, a value of 0
was defined since the service provider is assumed to be
trusted. As weighting parameter we chose γ1 = 2, γ2 = 1,
and γ3 = 2. The reference context set is defined to entail
no privacy risk (c1 = 0, c2 = user, c3 = {user,user}). For
the friends of our fictive user, we assumed the same pri-
vacy settings, leading to the following values as depicted
in Table 3.
The privacy relevance metric introduced could clarify
that the different data types of OSN data classified in
our taxonomy greatly vary in the privacy risks they carry.
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Table 3 Proposed PRM for classes of the taxonomy by the
example of a Facebook profile
Data types PRM-value
Login data 0
Connection data 0
Application data 0
Mandatory data 0.4
Extended profile data 0.2
Ratings/ interests 0.6
Network data 0.4
Contextual data 0.6
Private commun. data ≈ 0
Disclosed data 0.2
Entrusted data 0.6
Incidental data 0.2
Disseminated data 0.8
These findings can help end users to increase their privacy
awareness when dealing with OSN data, on the one hand.
Particularly, the fact that the loss of control over own data
carries high risk is an essential and valuable insight gained.
The service providers, on the other hand, can benefit as
well, since this metric may suggest which concepts should
be revised in order to foster user privacy and improve the
quality of their services with regard to privacy.
This quite generic approach also brings some limita-
tions that need to be discussed. Currently, the metric
does not consider different expectations of the end users
toward privacy. To cover this issue, the context dimen-
sions could be extended by user sensitivity. In this paper,
however, our aim is to emphasize the difference of pri-
vacy risks attributed to distinct data types. Thus, we left
varying end user perceptions out of consideration for
the moment. The weight parameters were furthermore
only exemplary chosen to demonstrate the functioning.
To create a more realistic setting, empirical tests to find
appropriate values should be conducted in the future.
7 Conclusions
Despite the growing body of research addressing OSN
privacy issues, currently, data as one of the fundamen-
tal building blocks of OSN is not well understood. The
lack of a generally accepted terminology and classification
for existing data elements as well as the small number of
publications considering implications of differing seman-
tics of data types for social identity management further
substantiates the argument.
Yet, data is at the core of any discussion of privacy
issues on OSNs. Without a precise terminology and clas-
sification of all types of data on OSNs, it is difficult to
unambiguously specify privacy-related problems which
ultimately impedes the development of appropriate
solutions.
To address these shortcomings, a taxonomy for OSN
data types was developed in this paper. Based on a design-
oriented methodology, first, the body of literature was
analyzed to identify possible data elements and termi-
nological inconsistencies. Subsequently, a hierarchically
structured taxonomy was derived by studying fundamen-
tal user activities on OSNs and step-wise classifying the
identified data types into non-redundant partitions. The
discussion of data types revealed that privacy mainly
depends on the interplay of a data element’s content, the
extent and granularity of user control, and its concrete
implementation. Based on the understanding of privacy
implications of different data types, a privacy relevance
metric was proposed which allows to quantitatively assess
privacy threats for a given context. The subsequent eval-
uation of applying the taxonomy to five major OSNs
demonstrates its applicability to existingOSNs and reveals
implementation-specific differences in privacy settings of
various data types. A detailed evaluation using all of Face-
book’s data types further shows that it is possible to map
all these data types into the taxonomy.
Endnote
aNote that this article is an extended version of the
paper by Richthammer et al. presented at the 2013 ARES
conference [41].
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